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SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT PHYSICAL HARM,
DISCLAIMERS AND WARRANTIES
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF*
On March 6th in the year 1815 the issue before King's Bench
was whether the purchaser of waste silk had the right to expect that
it would possess any special qualities, absent an express warranty.
Lord Ellenborough, speaking for the court in Gardiner v. Gray,1 was
of the opinion that the silk would have to be saleable in the market
under the contract description, and so the implied warranty of mer-
chantable quality was born. 2
It is possible to accord this implied warranty of merchantability
a dubious honor by noting that after almost 150 years there still
remains a substantial doubt as to the content and rationale of the as-
surance. There is also a continuing debate concerning avoidance of
liability by the potential warrantor, witness the recent lengthy de-
cision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.' At least some of the con-
fusion can be traced to a lack of agreement as to the reasons for this
liability. The content of this warranty cannot be correctly outlined
without first referring to the reason for its existence. This discussion
is an attempt to display and analyze some of the cross currents present
in thought concerning the relation between this remedy and compensa-
tion for personal injuries.
Lord Ellenborough, in the course of his opinion, remarked that
"The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on the
dunghill." 4 Although this would appear to be belaboring the obvious,
apparently, 140 odd years has not been long enough to accept the truth
- Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955
Harvard. The author suffers from several allergies including a tobacco allergy which
forced him to quit smoking. There is no warranty, express or implied that this has not
affected his views toward the problems discussed herein.
1 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
2 This warranty is the sole warranty under discussion in this article. Although devel-
oped by case law, it is now enshrined in Section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act and in
Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity may overlap to some extent its companion, the implied warranty of fitness for a
special or particular purpose found in Section 15(1) of the Uniform Sales Act and
Section 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See 1 Williston, Sales § 235 (3d ed.
1948). Many of the cases cited herein may involve both warranties or only the implied
warranty of fitness. Generally, this has not been indicated in the citation if the proposi-
tion would not be altered by reason of the involvement of the other warranty.
The statement that the implied warranty of merchantability was born in 1815 may
not be wholly accurate because Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194
(1810), predates Gardiner v. Gray by five years. However, the latter is the leading
case on this subject. For a discussion of the development of this warranty, see Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 118-22 (1943).
3 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
4 Supra note 1, at 145, 171 Eng. Rep. at 47.
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of this earthy statement. In 1961, Judge Goodrich was unable to
concur in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
that there was a jury question as to whether a cigarette, if shown to
contain a cancer causing agent, was of merchantable quality.6 As-
suming proof of causation, 6 it is hard to imagine anything better fitted
for the mythical dunghill than Mr. Pritchard's cigarettes 7 but the
question of what constitutes a defective chattel for warranty purposes
is far from settled. The food and allergy cases8 present problems
which are essentially the same as the one discussed in Pritchard v.
Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. In all these cases there is no general
agreement as to when the goods are not of merchantable quality.
WARRANTY AND FAULT
The first analytical problem in this area is that the implied
warranty of merchantable quality is but one of several possible liabili-
ties. The generic phrase "products liability" covers a variety of
remedies available to the disgruntled purchaser. Perhaps the most
familiar is negligence through which the purchaser seeks to impose re-
sponsibility upon the manufacturer or marketer traceable to use of a
product either upon a theory of fault in the process of production or
fault in the process of distribution.9 A second remedy, that of the
implied warranty in question, apparently rejects fault as a basis for
liability and seeks to compensate the purchaser on some other theory.
This is where the difficulty arises. Under our system for compensating
individuals for losses factually attributable to acts of others, we re-
quire a reason for shifting loss other than causation alone, and tort,
contract and warranty are all loss shifting doctrines.' In a negligence
5 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 301-02 (3d Cir. 1961).
Since this article was written, the jury has brought in a verdict for the defendant in a
retrial of this case. It is reported that the jury found that there was no implied warranty
and also that Mr. Pritchard assumed the risk of smoking. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1962,
p. 27.
6 For a brief discussion of proof of causation in the cigarette cases, see 13 W. Res.
L. Rev. 782 (1962).
7 It is clear from Judge Goodrich's concurring opinion that he believed there was
no breach of implied warranty. The majority approved the implied warranty theory
but not in a way that lends support to the thesis advanced later in this article that the
consumer can always expect freedom from harm. The court would permit the jury to
take into account the quality of cigarettes distributed by other manufacturers. See 295
F.2d at 297.
8 For a general discussion of these cases, see Dickerson, Products Liability and the
Food Consumer, 183-230 (1951); 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 25 (1961);
2 Id. § 29.
9 Fault in distribution generally arises from failure to give adequate directions for
use. See Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions For Use and the Duty to
Warn, 41 Va. L. Rev. 145 (1955).
10 As thus embodied in a set of fairly concrete rules or presumptions, the
'implied warranty' is a much more useful guide in apportioning risks than either
of the ones above mentioned. It is far more highly standardized than the
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action we find the reason for shifting the loss in some characteristic
of the conduct of the factual-loss causer which deviates from an
established norm." If the action is contract then we find the reason
for loss shifting in consent.'" Warranty, unfortunately, stands in a no-
man's land or perhaps, better still, in a legal fourth dimension because
fault is not required 13 and neither is contractual intent. Historically, it
sounds both in tort and in contract 14 and the purchaser will argue for
the interpretation of history that best suits his immediate purpose.
The tort theory is warmly embraced when the defense of privity is
invoked" but the plaintiff urges contract when a short tort statute of
limitations is raised.' 6 However, the historical studies are not much
help in resolving the current issue. The passage of time has seen im-
concept of 'impossibility' and much more thoroughly disassociated from the
'contemplation of the parties.' It avoids the difficult introspective inference which
is associated with the conception of mutual mistake as to subject matter, and
deals, if at all, with standardized rather than individualized mental states.
Finally it avoids the difficulty of proof of negligence and the unpredictability of
a jury's administration of the standard of 'ordinary care under the circumstances,'
thus imposing an insurer's liability upon the seller.
Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 Colum. L.
Rev. 335, 357-58 (1924).
11 The struggle between punishment and compensation as the basis for defining
fault is outlined in Morris, Rough Justice and Utopian Ideals, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 730 (1930).
So far this struggle has also plagued implied warranty. See Wilson, Products Liability,
43 Calif. L. Rev. 614, 615-16 (1955).
1- Consent as a concept of legal or moral significance (as distinguished from that
isolated realm sometimes known as individual ethics) is manifested consent; it
has here no significance except in reference to another individual. Hence promise
which includes consent also includes some expectation or interest aroused in the
promise or beneficiary. This expectation or interest is typically determined by
the language or symbolization of the promise, read in its context of circum-
stances. The primary character of contract is thus a symbol which prescribes
the scope of the (primary) obligation assumed.
In this respect contract differs from tort, in which the obligation is not
ascertained from the symbolic content of the actor's conduct. The intentional
aggressor, the negligent driver, does not symbolize his tort obligation to the
threatened victim; even defamatory utterance does not express an obligation.
Deceitful utterances may manifest consent to an undertaking, and thus be viewed
as contract or as tort. . . . Everyone knows the difference between a broken
promise and a broken head, even though at the borderland the distinction be-
tween tort and contract becomes subtler as the symbolization of the promise
becomes less explicit and legal presumption fills larger and larger gaps.
Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 740-41
(1943).
13 1 Williston, Sales § 237 (3d ed. 1948).
14 The hybrid nature of warranty is discussed in Fisher, Implied Warranties of
Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract Hole, 11 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 262 (1956) and
Dickerson, op. cit. supra note 8, at 34-44.
1r The rise of strict liability as a remedy available to the disgruntled purchaser is
due, in large part, to the search for a way around the defense of privity. See discussion
of strict liability infra.
16 An interesting case is Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933), in
which the plaintiff convinced the court to award what are traditionally thought of as
tort damages and also to not apply the tort statute of limitations.
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plied warranty evolve from a merchantile remedy to a device for pro-
tecting the injured consumer, and the answer to the question of what
goes on the dunghill must be found in an understanding of the sig-
nificance of the remedy today.
The cigarette cases, 17 the cosmetic cases,"8 the bone-in-the-chicken
pie cases' reflect the current struggle between causation in fact and
fault as the reason for assessing warranty liability. It is possible to
find statements that warranty is liability for fault only20 and liability
without fault.2 If the latter be true we may well ask: "If not for
fault, then for what?" While it is helpful to know what warranty is
not, complete understanding is an affirmative matter. Lacking an un-
derstanding of what it is, fault, because it is the backbone of our
personal injury compensation system, is bound to return to shape
warranty responsibility.
The influence of fault as a basis for liability is demonstrated in
the now famous case of Perlmutter v. Betk David Hosp.2 in which
the plaintiff sought compensation for injuries sustained when she re-
ceived a transfusion of blood containing jaundice causing agents. Her
theory was that the hospital had sold her blood that was not of
merchantable quality. A majority of the New York Court of Appeals
never found it necessary to decide whether the blood was defective
since these judges believed the transaction was not a sale and therefore
the obligation found in Section 14(2) of the Uniform Sales Act2 3 could
not attach to it. No doubt the then unsettled question of charitable
immunity in New York played a part in the decision 24 but prominently
17 Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., supra note 5; Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962). Twelve to fifteen more suits are currently
pending. Wall St. Jour. Nov. 13, 1962, p. 4.
Is E.g. Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513
(1960). See also the cases collected in 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 29
(1961).
19 Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936). See also Brown
v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (sliver of bone in breaded pork chop);
Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944) (turkey bone
in creamed chicked actually made out of turkey); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d
323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (bone in chicken sandwich); Lane v. Swanson, 130 Cal. App.
2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955) (express warranty, bone in boneless chicken.)
20 Bold statements that warranty always requires fault of some kind are hard to
find. Usually the proposition is put defensively, that warranty liability in this case should
not be imposed because the defendant was not at fault. See, e.g., 27 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
167 (1960); 13 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (1961). However, a relentlessly consistent view that
fault is required can be found in Freedman, The Three-Pronged Sword of Damocles:
Cutter, Hennigson and Greenberg (1961).
21 E.g., 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 1586 (1956). Cf. 1 Frumer &
Friedman, Products Liability § 16.01 (1961).
22 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
23 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 96(2).
24 See generally, Note, 40 Cornell L.Q. 803, 807-08 (1955).
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displayed in the majority opinion was reliance upon absence of fault
as a basis for denying liability. The majority stated:
If, however, the court were to stamp as a sale the supplying
of blood-or the furnishing of other medical aid-it would
mean that the hospital, no matter how careful, no matter that
the disease-producing potential in the blood could not pos-
sibly be discovered, would be held responsible, virtually as
an insurer, if anything were to happen to the patient as a
result of 'bad' blood . . . . According to the complaint, the
blood administered to plaintiff was 'contaminated' with
jaundice viruses, with the result that she was afflicted with
homologous serum hepatitis or serum jaundice. Informed
opinion is at hand that there is today neither a means of
detecting the presence of the jaundice-producing agent in the
donor's blood nor a practical method of treating the blood to
be used for transfusion so that the danger may be elimi-
nated ... but, whether that is so or not, the fact is that, if
the transaction were to be deemed a sale, liability would at-
tach irrespective of negligence or other fault. The art of
healing frequently calls for a balancing of risks and dangers
to a patient. Consequently, if injury results from the course
adopted, where no negligence or fault is present, liability
should not be imposed upon the institution or agency actually
seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient. -
Here is a curious situation in which the decision not to apply a
statutory non-fault liability is based on the fact that the defendant
was not at fault in traditional negligence terms. Such an approach can
only be explained in terms of a lack of an understanding as to what
the implied warranty of merchantability means.26 A sounder approach
would be to ascertain the rationale of this warranty obligation and
then decide whether to invoke the statute by analogy27 in light of the
basis of that obligation.
Another example of intermingling fault and no-fault concepts
can be found in cases involving privity. For instance, Spence v. Three
25 Supra note 22, at 106-07, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
26 It has been suggested that if fault was necessary to support warranty liability
in this case it might have been found in the fact that a hospital deals in blood and can
test the reliability of its source of supply. Note, 31 Ind. LJ. 367, 373 (1956). This
seems to be a rather artificial concept of fault related to the particular product. There
should be no need to search for fault in an attempt to justify the result.
27 See generally, Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957). On the question of how statutes can be used in this respect,
see Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934) and
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle
Road," 40 Texas L. Rev. 751, 822-48 (1962).
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Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Co."' was hailed by some com-
mentators20 as abolishing the defense of privity in all Michigan prod-
ucts liability cases. In Spence the plaintiff had purchased some defec-
tive cinder blocks from an independent contractor. She subsequently
brought an action for breach of warranty against the manufacturer,
although the evidence at trial, according to the appellate court, would
also have substantiated a negligence claim. 30 The trial court dismissed
the action because of lack of privity but the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed. The court's action was prompted by a belief that the plain-
tiff had been induced not to plead negligence by previous opinions of
the court equating warranty with a duty to exercise due care. Ap-
parently the majority felt that privity should fail in at least this
instance. Justice Voelker, then proceeded to increase the confusion:
Care does not increase or diminish by calling it names. We
think the abstract concept of reasonable care is in itself
quite difficult enough to grapple with and apply in our law
without our courts gratuitously conferring honorary degrees
upon it. There is only one degree of care in the law, and that
is the standard of care which may reasonably be required or
expected under all the circumstances of a given situation,
whether arising in the manufacture of canned beans or cinder
blocks. Such confusion of care with privity in these cases
is not only bad in itself, but, worse yet, it inevitably tends to
maim and muddy up the larger field of law in both contracts
and torts.
We observe-and the defendant seeks to make much of
the fact-that the declaration in the present action is not in
terms grounded upon negligence of the defendant, although
certain of the proofs, as already indicated, tend rather clearly
to show its negligence. We also find that in Michigan-what-
ever the rule may be elsewhere-there is authority for treat-
ing actions of this kind based upon implied warranty by the
manufacturer as though they were explicitly grounded upon
negligence.
Thus, we said in Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416,
423 (although we limited our remarks to foodstuffs):
The implied warranty, so-called, reaching from the
28 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
29 Note, 48 Geo. L.J. 606, 607 (1960); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale LJ. 1099, 1107 n.54 (1960); Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg.
Co., 277 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1960). But cf. Note, 34 Notre Dame Law, 149, 151
(1958).
30 "In this case it appears that there was a lack of due care. Merely to describe
what happened to the blocks should be showing enough on that score-but here the
defendant admitted it inspected or tested neither the raw materials nor the finished
blocks." 353 Mich. at 135, 90 N.V.2d at 881.
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manufacturer of foodstuffs to the ultimate pur-
chaser for immediate consumption is in the nature of
a representation that the highest degree of care
has been exercised and a breach of such duty in-
flicting personal injury is a wrong in the nature of
a tort and not a mere breach of contract to be
counted on in assumpsit. Except in name and to
establish privity between the manufacturer and the
ultimate consumer it is the same thing as negligence.
Plaintiff's case, in its last analysis, is bottomed on
negligence....
Whether this notion only adds to the confusion or is
any sounder legal reasoning than some of the other things
we have said in the past in this area may be open to some
dispute, but if we have thus solemnly told litigants and their
counsel that suing for breach of an implied warranty is in
effect tantamount to suing for negligence (one might think,
for one thing, that the burden of proof might in some cases
be more onerous on the plaintiff in the latter situation) we
lack the heart to banish this plaintiff in this case because she
trustingly took us at our word. We suggest in the future,
however, that, where warranted by the circumstances, such
declarations should sound explicitly in negligence as well as
for claimed breach of warranty.31
Two things may be noted concerning this opinion. First, if it
did signal the abandonment of privity in Michigan, 2 this occurred
in a case where fault was evident. This illustrates a tendency some-
times present to abolish privity at first where fault is most likely.
The converse of this proposition is that warranty liability may
lag where fault is least likely. Thus, the Texas court in Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps33 found privity between manufacturer
and consumer no bar to warranty liability when food sold in a sealed
container proved defective, and on the same day held the retailer of
the sealed container responsible.3" But when the question of whole-
saler's liability was presented the result was 5 to 4 in favor of retaining
the defense for the wholesaler who passed along the sealed package.35
The judge with the crucial vote did not see why the wholesaler should
31 353 Mich. at 130-31, 90 NAV.2d at 878-79.
32 There is still some lingering doubt as to whether the Michigan court is willing
to let go of privity. See Boshkoff, Sales and Secured Transactions, 1961 Annual Survey
of Michigan Law, 9 Wayne L. Rev. - (1962).
33 139 Tex. 609, 164 SAV.2d 828 (1942).
34 Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
35 Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952); 31 Texas
L. Rev. 594 (1953).
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be held liable. He was unable to find "fault" in the wholesaler's con-
duct.3
6
Consider further a statement made in a 1960 law review
comment on a Virginia case 37 holding the manufacturer of defective
food liable in implied warranty. After noting that the consumer ap-
parently has an action against both the manufacturer and the retailer
the writer comments on a situation almost the reverse of Decker:
A principal effect of this holding is to permit the consumer the
convenience of suing the local retailer rather than the less
accessible manufacturer, but public policy should not be
predicated upon the convenience of one party at the expense
and inconvenience of another party who is without fault.3"
(Emphasis supplied.)
The second interesting aspect of the Spence opinion, is that the
majority admitted that they had previously confused the difference
between warranty and negligence but then refused to take the definite
position that negligence was immaterial in imposing warranty liability.
The failure to make clear, what at this late date should be obvious,3"
induced counsel in a recent case to argue that negligence had to be
proved to establish breach of warranty.40 Happily, this position was
finally repudiated by the court. Nevertheless, it was an event much too
long in anticipation and illustrates graphically the hesitancy to admit
that warranty is in a class apart from negligence.
A final example of the influence of fault on the implied warranty
of merchantability may be found in those food cases which draw the
line of responsibility with the aid of the "natural to the object test."
The classic case here is Mix v. Ingersol Candy Co.4 in which the con-
sumer sought to recover damages occasioned by a chicken bone in a
chicken pie. Recovery was denied on the basis that the bone was
natural to the object consumed.42 Initially, it would seem that this test
apparently has an appealing objective nature; 43 however, its rationality
3G "Neither does the rationale of the Decker case fit his situation since there is
neither opportunity to know and control the contents of the sealed package nor repre-
sentations or inducements made by him to the consumer." Id at 372, 251 S.W.2d at 168,
37 Swift & Co. v. Vells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203, (1959).
38 27 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 167, 169 (1960). See also Waite, Retail Responsibility
and Judicial Law Making, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 494 (1936).
39 See 1 Williston, Sales § 237 (3d ed. 1948).
40 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918
(1961).
41 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
42 See also Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (sliver of bone
in breaded pork chop) and Maiss v. Hatch, 8 Cal. Repr. 351 (Super. Ct. 1960) (bone
in hamburger).
43 Its objectivity disappears when we realize that naturalness depends upon the
food in question. As the court pointed out in Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323,
328, 103 N.W.2d 64, 67 (1960), what is natural at one stage of preparation may not be
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has been questioned.44 It is likely, whatever the merits or demerits of
the distinction, that it owes its existence to a confusion of warranty and
negligence liability.4" If we focus only on the duty not to add impurities
to food and forget about the duty to remove impurities, we may feel
that there is more probably careless processing when the offending ob-
ject is not a normally constituent part of the food product prior to the
start of processing.
It is submitted that the first difficulty we have in resolving whether
Mr. Pritchard's cigarettes belong on the mythical dunghill is the still
present inability to reject some type of fault as the basis for com-
pensating injured consumers. To secure an answer to this question,
a substitute rationale is needed.
WARRANTY AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
The law of warranty, because it did not originate as an attempt
to solve the problem of accidental injuries,4 presents a second difficulty
in thinking through the question of whether Mr. Pritchard's cigarettes
are of merchantable quality. Originally, warranty was a commercial
remedy. Consequently, assimilating it into the arsenal of the injured
consumer's attorney has not been entirely easy because what might
be commercially merchantable may not be satisfactory for the con-
sumer.
Viewing implied warranty as a device for satisfying the profit
expectation inherent in a transaction, it is possible to accept the
proposition that perfection need not be the characteristic of any
particular chattel.47 The doctrine of consideration does not require
exact equality in the exchange of promises. Commercially, implied
warranty complements this rule by securing to the purchaser, in the
absence of express agreement, neither the best nor the worst and,
like consideration, it merely sets minimum standards. If we view each
purchase of a chattel as a business deal involving a risk, it is possible
to state that implied warranty satisfies the purchaser's expectation
that he is taking only a normal risk. While he may hope that each
chattel purchased is perfect, the implied warranty of merchantability
natural at another. Thus the test still requires analysis of the supposed qualities of the
food in question.
44 Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer 184-85 (1951); Ezer, The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties,
8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 281, 304 (1961).
45 Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., supra note 43.
46 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1570 (1956).
47 The characteristics required are discussed in Prosser, The Implied Warranty of
Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 125-39 (1943). The Uniform Commercial
Code, unlike the Uniform Sales Act spells out the minimum attributes of the warranty.
Some attributes, at least, provide for less than perfection. See §§ 2-313(b), (d) & Com-
ment 7.
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insures that occasional disappointments of this hope will be more than
balanced by long run gains secured through prudent bargaining.
When the transition is made from a commercial remedy to the
personal injury area there is no longer margin for error. Purchase of
goods by a consumer involves only the expectation that they will not
harm him. Perfection is required. There can be no balancing of gains
and losses as far as his health is concerned. 48 Prudent bargaining here
is not directed toward the acquisition of a profit opportunity, it seeks
instead freedom from the danger of personal injury. However, it is in
differentiating between these two expectations that the difficulty arises.
Returning to the case of Mr. Pritchard's cigarettes we may note
that law review comment has not been favorable. As one student
writer states:
[T]he standard of merchantability is not so rigid. The case
law and tort writers seem to agree that a product of fair
average quality would clearly satisfy the warranty of mer-
chantability. Since there was no evidence to show that
Chesterfields were inferior to other cigarettes on the market,
the jury should not have been permitted to find for the
plaintiff on that count.49
Another adds:
[There was no] . . . showing that defendant's product was
made of commercially unsatisfactorily tobacco or that it dif-
fered substantially from other cigarettes .... Judged by the
cigarettes which pass on the market, it is submitted that
Chesterfield cigarettes could not have been found to be un-
merchantable under any previous application of the law.50
And finally:
The Chesterfields purchased by plaintiff would also seem
suitable for the general purpose for which goods described as
Chesterfields or as cigarettes, generally, are manufactured.
The warranty must be reasonably construed in light of com-
mon knowledge with reference to the nature of the article
or product sold. 1
All these statements are illustrative of the concept of merchanta-
48 It is interesting to note that Harper and James mention the commercial expecta-
tion theory of warranty. However, when consumers' injuries are involved the expectation
theory is dropped and the problem is seen as one of minimizing danger and distributing
losses. 2 Harper & James, op cit. supra note 46, at 1571. Later, it is noted that the
standard of safety is the same as in negligence. Id. at 1584.
49 42 B.U.L. Rev. 250, 255 (1962).
50 26 Albany L. Rev. 354, 359 (1962).
51 50 Calif. L. Rev. 566, 568 (1962).
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bility only as a commercial remedy.52 One is inclined to ask the
somewhat facetious question of whether the lack of cancer-causing
ingredients in any particular pack of cigarettes would make that pack
unmerchantable. Of course not, since the quality absent is not de-
sired. Why, then, is it so easy to shrug off the presence of this un-
desirable quality? The answer must be found in a general unwilling-
ness to believe that consumer expectations demand, in some cases,
perfection, as contrasted with the merchantile expectation of average
quality.
The reluctance of the law review commentators to find cigarettes
defective has parallels in other situations involving injured consumers.
For instance, consider the line of cases which offer an alternative to
the "natural to the object test" discussed earlier, i.e., one requiring
"reasonable reliance" by the consumer. In Goodwin v. Country Club
of Peoria,3 where a turkey bone in creamed turkey caused the death
of plaintiff's decedent, judgment was for the defendant because the
court felt that warranty should be considered in light of common
knowledge with reference to the nature and character of the food
being served. So too, a 3 X 2 cm. oyster shell in fried oysters did not
create a breach of implied warranty, the theory being that a reasonable
consumer expects to get an occasional oyster shell in fried oysters.
5 4
In the same year, the North Carolina Supreme Court was of the
opinion that a reasonable consumer would expect to find a crystalized
piece of corn in a box of Kelloggs Corn Flakes.5 5
However, to say that a consumer can reasonably expect an oyster
shell in fried oysters invokes the picture of a person sitting and chew-
ing carefully because he expects that he may run across something
which might injure him. This reasonable expectation test is not based
on reality. If we admit that the consumer is not abusing the product,
we should also admit that he expects that it will not injure him in any
manner. Denying liability on the basis that his expectation of safety
is unreasonable is equivalent to stating that the consumer, as a matter
of law, is guilty of contributory negligence. One can imagine the re-
action of a typical jury to the defense that the plaintiff should have
chewed his food more carefully so as to avoid choking on a turkey
bone,'; but in any event the theory of these cases is defective from
another viewpoint. The reasonable expectation test looks to the manner
52 Even the majority opinion in Pritchard does reject the commercial conception
completely. See the discussion at note 7 supra.
63 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944).
54 Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
55 Adams v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960).
56 See Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter, 212 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954), in which
the defense of contributory negligence failed. For a discussion of this defense and an
assertion that warranty law can do without it, see Note, 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 85 (1962).
See also 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 27.02 (1961).
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in which injury is inflicted. Suppose that two identical consumers
receive identical throat injuries from objects in turkey pies. One con-
sumer is unfortunate enough to choke on a turkey bone. He loses
because he ought to have expected it. The second man chokes on a
nail. Are we prepared to say that he should have expected a nail?
Unless we are, he should recover in warranty and it seems that we
have made a distinction in the rights of the two consumers that can-
not be defended. The trouble is that the real consumer expectation is
that there will be no harm accruing from the eating of a turkey pie
in a normal manner and there is a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability when this expectation is not fulfilled.
At one point it would have been possible to say that the implied
warranty of merchantability extended protection only to commercial
interests, protecting merely the "contract price." However, the door
was closed on this possibility when it was decided that the doctrine
announced in Hadley v. Baxendale57 did not prevent recovery of con-
sequential damages for physical harm.
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them
has broken, the damages which the other party ought to re-
ceive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as
may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising na-
turally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from
such a breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances
under which the contract was actually made were communi-
cated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to
both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such
a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would
be the amount of injury, which would ordinarily follow from
a breach of contract under these special circumstances so
known and communicated.
As Professor Patterson has pointed out, since the scope of damages
under this doctrine is much narrower than the "proximate conse-
quence" rule in tort law, the Hadley decision allows the law to en-
courage the entrepeneur engaged in a risky business by reducing the
extent of his risk below the amount of damage arguably attributable
to his acts." Application of the limitation inherent in a Hadley test
involves a decision as to what interests of the plaintiff are to be
57 9 Exch. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1845).
58 Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks through Legal Devices, 24 Colum.
L. Rev. 335, 342 (1924).
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protected. 9 This was precisely the issue when Judge Cardozo wrote
his opinion in Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores."' Recovery in that
case was sought on an implied warranty theory for injuries caused
by a pin in a loaf of bread. The defendant argued that under the
Uniform Sales Act6 ' the purchaser was limited to recovery of the pur-
chase price. Judge Cardozo rejected this contention and permitted
recovery for personal injuries occasioned by the offending pin. The
dealer obviously had notice of the nature of the transaction, bread
purchased for human consumption, and so consequential damages
were awarded.6 There is no question that the Ryan opinion is sound.
However, manipulation of the concept of merchantability to deny
recovery in certain cases actually represents an erosion of the
principles enunciated by Judge Cardozo. If we accept the proposition
that physical harm comes within the contemplation rule, it requires a
substantial amount of mental gymnastics then to conclude that the
product causing such contemplated harm is merchantable.6 3
WARRANTY AND STRICT LIABILITY
A further source of confusion may be found in the recent as-
cendancy of strict liability as the ultimate remedy available to the
consumer. The extent of this liability is stated in the proposed section
402A of the new Restatement of Torts:6 4
One engaged in the business of selling food for human con-
sumption or other products for intimate bodily use, who
sells such a product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer, is subject to liability for bodily
harm thereby caused to one who consumes it, even though
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prep-
aration and sale of the product, and
59 Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 50-55 (1927). See also McCormick, The
Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract, 19 Minn.
L. Rev. 497, 503-04 (1935).
60 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
61 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 150(6) & (7). However, the defendants did not go far
enough into the statute as the court pointed out. "The measure is more liberal where
special circumstances are present with proof of special damage (§§ 150(7) & 151). Here
the dealer had notice from the nature of the transaction that the bread was to be eaten.
Knowledge that it was to be eaten was knowledge that the damage would be greater
than the price .... " Supra note 60, at 395, 175 N.E. at 107.
62 See also Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932) and
Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933). Dean McCormick notes that the
issue is usually phrased in terms of whether there exists an implied warranty in favor
of the particular plaintiff, McCormick, Damages 673 n.62 (1935).
63 Where the Uniform Commercial Code is not in force then it would be theoretically
possible to backtrack by ignoring or repudiating Ryan and similar decisions. The Code
closes this loophole by specifically stating in Section 2-175(2) (b) that injuries to persons
are considered to be consequential damages flowing from breach of warranty.
64 Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
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(b) the consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
There is no doubt that the growth of strict liability was greatly
encouraged by the intricacies of the law of sales. Privity and notice
were two very sore spots and a comment to the proposed section 402A
tells us that it is definitely not a traditional warranty liability.Y5 Dean
Prosser, in a view which is probably shared by many others, clearly
indicated his dissatisfaction with warranty:
All this is pernicious and entirely unnecessary. . . No one
doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the consumer
must be in tort and not in contract. There is no need to
borrow a concept from the contract law of sales; and it is
'only by. some violent pounding and twisting' that 'warranty'
can be made to serve the purpose at all. Why talk of it?
If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict
liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory con-
tract mask. Such strict liability is familiar enough in the law
of animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, work-
men's compensation, and respondeat superior. There is noth-
ing so shocking about it today that cannot be accepted and
stand on its own feet in this new and additional field, pro-
vided always that public sentiment, public demand, and
'public policy' have reached the point where the change is
called for. There are not lacking indications that some of the
courts are about ready to throw away the crutch, and to
admit what they are really doing, when they say that the
warranty is not the one made on the original sale, and does
not run with the goods, but is a new and independent one
made directly to the consumer; and that it does not arise out
of or depend upon any contract, but is imposed by the law,
in tort, as a matter of policy. 66
That this theory of strict liability is meritorious is without ques-
tion. But what is to become of implied warranty? Perhaps it will
coalesce with the theory of strict liability" but this would seem to
be an unfortunate development. There is a place for both types of
liability because they actually attempt to accomplish different things.
65 Id. Comment m. For a discussion of this proposed section, see Condon, Restate-
ment or Reformation?, 16 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 473 (1961) and Dickerson, The Basis
of Strict Products Liability, 16 id. 585 (1961).
66 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
67 Cf. James, Products Liability, 34 Texas L. Rev. 192, 227-28 (1955) and James,
General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn. L.
Rev. 923, 926-27 (1957).
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Strict liability as set forth in the Restatement will not protect the
consumer in all cases. The product must not only be defective, it must
be unreasonably dangerous. Presumably this contemplates a balancing
of the community interest in having the product marketed against
the individual consumer interest in freedom from harm.68 Pasteur
serum is a good example of such a product because it is unavoidably
unsafe.69 So too, "[Good] tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful. .... ,70 Since
this is true, it would seem unwise to amalgamate the two liabilities.
Where we are speaking of a liability which is imposed as a matter of
public policy and cannot be disclaimed, such a balancing of interests
is proper. But why should this be extended to implied warranty? 71
Just because a product is socially desirable does not mean that con-
sumers do not have certain expectations concerning this product
which should not be disappointed. It is not inconsistent to say that a
product is socially desirable and still enforce consumer expectations
concerning it. A cigarette may be considered useful and still the con-
sumer may expect that its use will not hurt him. This is why the test
for strict liability ought not to pre-empt the field. It defines an obliga-
tion that may not be disclaimed.72 It is only when we assume that the
consumer expectation may not be influenced by the marketer or manu-
facturer that we ought to be concerned with the possibility that produc-
tion of the product may be discouraged. On the other hand a balancing
of interests test is not essential where the consumer expectation may
be varied by the manufacturer or distributor.
Both theories have their place. Strict liability seeks to protect
the consumer from unreasonable dangers arising from the non-negligent
marketing of defective products. Implied warranty can serve to protect
the consumer's expectation that he will not be harmed through use
of the product. Thus the test suggested for defining breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability is this: Did use of the chattel
in a normal manner result in unexpected personal injury to the
consumer? If the answer is yes, then liability is established. Es-
sentially, the only items of proof for the plaintiff would be causation
and damages. Under this test a cigarette causing cancer, a turkey pie
containing a turkey bone and a cosmetic causing an isolated allergic
reaction would all be unmerchantable. Judge Cameron, dissenting in
another recent case73 involving the warranty liability of a cigarette
08 Cf. Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A, Comment k (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
69 Ibid.
70 Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A, Comment i (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
71 But cf. Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 Texas L. Rev.
193, 209-10 (1961).
72 Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A, Comment m. (Tent. Draft No. 7 1962).
See also Prosser, supra note 66, at 1131-33.
73 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, (5th Cir. 1962).
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manufacturer, thought that an appropriate way to state the obligation
would be as follows:
American guarantees that the cigarettes contained in this
package are fit to be used by purchaser, a human being, by
lighting and drawing smoke from them into the lungs, so
that the ingredients of the cigarettes carried in on the smoke
may be deposited on the walls of the blood vessels situated
therein, to the end that said ingredients will be absorbed
into the blood stream and will produce in the smoker the
soothing and relaxing sensations normally attending such
use; that said cigarettes do not contain any harmful or
deleterious substance; and that it will indemnify the user
against any injury, loss or damage which may result from
the smoking of said cigarettes.74
Such a statement, however far it goes toward satisfaction of the
ordinary customer's expectation, could not command a majority vote
of his colleagues."5 We have also seen before that consumer expecta-
tions are not always satisfactory, witness the bone in the pie and
similar situations. Perhaps, the difficulties faced by the consumer have
been caused by some fundamental reasons for non-compensation of
this type of harm. Before accepting the test proposed it would be
wise to consider some objections to it.
SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPECTATION TEST
One objection to this type of liability might be that it will in-
crease the possibility of fraudulent claims against the manufacturer or
retailer. This same objection has been voiced with respect to the
allergy cases, which, as Professor Dickerson has indicated, may be be-
hind the denial of recovery in some of these cases.76 On the other hand,
he points out that the possibilities for fraud will not vary with the
rationale of responsibility. 7 Thus it is submitted that, even under
the consumer expectation test advanced here, the plaintiff will still
have to establish a causal relation between object and injury. Manu-
facturers are not without weapons to fight fraud78 and, if it is* thought
to be a problem, a fairer approach would be to acknowledge its
existence and seek to find an antidote by tightening requirements of
proof. Unexpressed and untested premises only increase the chances
for irrational growth of legal doctrine.
74 Id. at 81-82 [interpreting Florida law].
75 Because Florida law was involved and also because Judge Cameron dissented,
the court on rehearing granted a motion to certify questions on Florida law to the
Florida Supreme Court. See 304 F.2d at 85-86.
76 Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer 215 (1951).
77 Id. at 263-64.
78 Ibid.
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A second difficulty involved in securing observance of the test
suggested is the thought seldom stated openly that this type of
liability would be an undue burden on industry or in some way would
be unfair.79 Apparently, the idea is that the marketer would be subject
to staggering losses which it would be unable to prevent or insure
against. Assuming this is arguable, the results of the theory in
operation are certainly not impressive, and this is best illustrated by
the allergy cases.
In some cases, notably those in which a cosmetic is involved, re-
covery for personal injury is denied on the ground that the plaintiff is
"peculiar" or that an idiosyncrasy is involved. Thus when plaintiff
can show that he is a member of a class of persons who will be injured
through the use of a product recovery follows,"0 otherwise it is denied."
A recent law review note 2 has suggested that the majority rule denying
recovery to an allergic person is consistent in result with the minority
rule permitting it. In all cases where a sizable class of allergic persons
was involved the minority rule was invoked. Where the plaintiff ap-
peared to be an isolated individual the majority rule was announced.
But this does not explain why an allergic victim should receive dif-
ferent legal treatment than the victim of a toxic reaction. One writer
has argued that the peculiar treatment of allergies is due to the thought
that there are so many allergic persons around that the liability
involved is too fantastic to be imposed. 3 However, this idea of an
"undue burden" cannot be accepted. Since the courts hesitate to
grant recovery when they consider the reaction peculiar to the plain-
tiff and grant it when the plaintiff becomes the member of a class,
they are actually granting recovery when the potential liability through
all claimants is great and denying it when only a single potential claim
is involved. Assuming a constant figure for all allergy claims, it is
the isolated claim which presents the smallest chance of disaster for
the particular defendant.
Another branch of the undue burden argument would seem to
be that since everybody is allergic to something, 4 the potential lia-
bility of all types of allergic reaction per product is such that recovery
should be denied. If this is true then the allergy cases are incon-
79 Dickerson, supra note 76, at 216-17; Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co., 120 Utah 474,
235 P.2d 525 (1951) (negligence); Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 465, 472 (1961). Contra, Lane v.
Swanson, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955) (express warranty).
80 See, e.g., Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (1939); Crotty
v. Shartenberg's New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
81 See, e.g., Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
82 Note, 46 Cornell L.Q. 465, 469 (1961).
83 Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based Upon Breach
of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. Calif. L. Rev. 221, 235 (1951).
84 For the medical background of allergies, see 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products
Liability § 28 (1961).
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sistent. There should be no recovery even if a recognizable class is
involved. But is it reasonable to say that because so many consumer
expectations will be disappointed we ought not to satisfy them? Is the
warranty rule to be that consumers' expectations are to be fulfilled
as long as it does not involve giving a cause of action to too many
consumers? The allergy cases are a good example of the lack of
agreement about the nature of implied warranty. Insofar as they
represent a worry about some undue burden they either are worrying
about a non-existent danger or they deny a consumer expectation
rationale for warranty liability. The latter possibility then returns us
to the initial part of this discussion which dealt with the affirmative
reasons for warranty liability. Unless it is thought that warranty is
another name for negligence or for enterprise liability,80 it is sug-
gested that recovery must be granted for all allergic reactions which
the consumer does not expect to incur.
Somewhat related to the undue burden argument is the thought
that imposing responsibility for unforeseeable consequences of use will
stifle progress. It is to be expected that our increasing scientific knowl-
edge concerning causation will lead to an ever increasing number of
claims. The cigarette cancer lawsuits are one example of this trend.
The increasing awareness of allergies is another. There is a paradox
here. Before knowledge of cancer and allergies became widespread
the consumer could not sue because he could not show causation. Now
that we are becoming aware of the hazards accompanying the use of
some products there is hesitancy in imposing liability because the
causation link may be found to be so common.
Perhaps there is reason to worry that the manufacturer of new
products will hesitate to market them because of the danger that
harm will occur even though all due care has been taken to see that
the product is safe. This seems particularly true in regard to the drug
industry which has argued that warranty liability will deter product
development.86 The answer to this argument appears obvious. The
manufacturer who worries about possible unforeseen consequences
from use of his product need merely destroy the consumer expectation
that it is absolutely harmless. If the marketer lets the consumer know
that he (the marketer) is not sure that the product is safe for all to
use the consumer can intelligently appraise the desirability of this
product.8s
There is another answer to the drug industry's problem. There
may be certain manufacturers and sellers who do not create a con-
85 Cf. Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1955).
86 Comment, Strict Liability for Drug Manufacturers: Public Policy Misconceived,
13 Stan. L. Rev. 645, 649 (1961).
87 Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions For Use and the Duty to Warn,
41 Va. L. Rev. 145, 160 (1955).
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sumer expectation through the marketing of their product because of
the manner of distribution. The Gottsdanker case,, is such an example
where implied warranty liability arose out of the sale of polio vaccine.
It is questionable whether the user had any expectation regarding the
purchase of that vaccine that is comparable to the expectation formed
by the purchaser of a new car."9 So too in the Perlmutter case already
discussed,90 the decision to not apply the Uniform Sales Act by analogy
should have been based on a lack of consumer expectation rather than
on the question of lack of fault. However, where there is a consumer
expectation arising out of a certain transaction, it seems logical to
state that the expectation will be satisfied perforce the warranty
while still permitting the marketer to change it by appropriate means.
The same analysis should dispose of the argument that we will
not impose this absolute liability upon the manufacturer of an item
whose social utility outweighs the risk of harm to the individuaL This
is the strict liability test found in the Restatement of Torts. The
answer is that we certainly will not impose this absolute liability if
the manufacturer wishes to inform the consumer of the danger of use.
The consumer, informed of the dangers of use or of the manufacturer's
uncertainty about unforeseeable side effects, can decide for himself
whether the product is to be purchased.
DISCLAniERs: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
The argument up to this point has assumed that the manufacturer
or marketer has, and will continue to have, the power to mold the
expectations of potential consumers. This assumption now invites a
brief look at Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,9' a case notable not
only for the length of the opinion written by the court but also for
the blow aimed at the use of a standard disclaimer in the automobile
industry. Although the result is not questioned, an examination of the
basis for ignoring the disclaimer may be worth-while.
We start with the assumption that the Uniform Sales Act au-
thorizes at least some disclaimers; 92 so does the Uniform Commercial
Code.93 However, since the "Big Three"; G.M., Ford and Chrysler,
represented 93.5 per cent of the passenger car production for 1958, 91
the Henningsen court felt that the monopolistic character of the industry
altered this picture. Thus it stated:
88 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 694, 6 Cal. Rep. 320 (1960).
89 Consumer expectations of safety may be reinforced by advertising designed to
boost the prestige of a firm or industry. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 122-27, Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories, supra note 88.
oo See text accompanying note 22 et. seq.
01 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
92 Uniform Sales Act § 71.
03 UCC § 2-316; cf. § 2-719(3).
94 Supra note 91, at 390, 161 A.2d at 87.
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The lawmakers did not authorize the automobile manu-
facturer to use its grossly disproportionate bargaining power
to relieve itself from liability and to impose on the ordinary
buyer, who in effect has no real freedom of choice, the grave
danger of injury to himself and others that attends the sale
of such a dangerous instrumentality as a defectively made
automobile. 5
The thought expressed here is that the buyer must have freedom of
choice and that such freedom is not possible in the face of a monopolis-
tic seller. Accepting the court's definition of the relevant market, 0
what is meant by a free choice? Free choice may be used in one of two
senses. We may say that the buyer has a free choice if he can buy
a car without a disclaimer from one of the Big Three. We might also
say that buyer has a free choice if he may decide to buy a car instead
of doing without one. Apparently, the court is thinking of free choice
in the first sense. If so, how does this relate to the disclaimer problem?
Even if Ford avoided the dubious sales practice indulged in by
Chrysler it would have been of no avail to Mr. Henningsen since he
failed to read the contract and a reading would have been necessary
to alert him to the necessity for exercising this free choice. It seems
inappropriate to urge protection of this freedom of choice for a con-
sumer ignorant of the possibilities of the advantage inherent in choice.
But further still, there is no clear indication of why there should
be this type of freedom to choose. This supposed freedom is not just
to choose a product but to choose the characteristics that this particu-
lar product shall have. Let us suppose that the Big Three decided to
market cars in only three colors: blue, black and white. Could a pur-
chaser argue that a contract designation of black for a car ordered was
invalid and that he was entitled to damages because the uniform
marketing practice deprived him of the opportunity to choose a red
car? Such a hypothetical situation seems ridiculous but Henningsen
purports to grant the consumer the right to ignore a contract provision.
If we have decided that the consumer has the right to insist on certain
product characteristics, it would seem that such a holding should be
made after analyzing the type of product involved and its social
necessity, and not on the basis of the industry market structure. The
attention of the Henningsen court, therefore, seems somewhat mis-
directed. If the consumer is to be given the right to demand freedom
from personal injury, it does not matter at all how monopolistic the
95 Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
96 However, if used car sales were considered, then the Big Three's share in any
one year would decrease sharply. Also the purchaser would not be met with a standard
disclaimer.
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seller is. It is the product involved that counts.9 7 Since such a decision
is an intricate one, it should not be made where easier but adequate
grounds for a decision exist. It seems that a sounder but less involved
basis for rejecting use of the disclaimer in Henningsen is the manner in
which it is presented to the consumer. The court noted in this regard:
The draftsmanship is reflective of the care and skill of the
Automotive Manufacturers Association in undertaking to
avoid warranty obligations without drawing too much at-
tention to its effort in that regard. No one can doubt that if
the will to do so were present, the ability to inform the
buying public of the intention to disclaim liability for injury
claims arising from breach of warranty would present no
problem. 8
It seems perfectly fair to ignore the disclaimer in the instant case
because of the way in which it is phrased. However, if the Big Three
wish to bring home to their customers the fact that automobiles some-
times are defective and that they will not be responsible for personal
injuries unless traceable to their 9negligence, what is wrong with this?
On the other hand, a clear distinction ought to be drawn between at-
tempts to inform consumers of product characteristics and attempts
to induce purchase while simultaneously absolving the seller from
liability for the existence of these characteristics. For instance there
is nothing reprehensible about inducing the purchase of a car by paint-
ing it an attractive shade of blue and simultaneously informing the
purchaser that the color may fade and disclaiming responsibility for
such fading. But when the disclaimer follows an attempt to create the
impression that the fading will not take place then there is little need
to judicially sanction this procedure. It is only the most sophisticated
purchaser that could comprehend the substance of the provision deny-
ing him the benefit of the expectation just created.9
The danger in the Henningsen opinion is that all of it may be
97 At this point the question becomes one of strict liability. In a contract setting,
the question is the enforceability of a contract of adhesion. See generally, Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 628
(1943). It is my belief that what matters is not only the content of the contract of
adhesion but also the object to which it adheres. If the contract is to be disregarded, in
toto or in part, it must be due to the fact that a product of great social desirability is
involved.
98 Supra note 91, at 400, 161 A.2d at 93.
90 This is best illustrated by the seed cases in which the expectation created by the
description of the product is denied by the disclaimer. E.g. Pyle v. Eastern Seed Co.,
145 Tex. 385, 198 S.W.2d 562 (1946). See also Llewellyn, What Price Contract-An
Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 733 n.62 (1931).
The Big Three have not yet changed their ways. They still are trying hard to avoid
shaping consumer expectations, by using three separate forms which are just as unin-
formative as the common one previously used. See Honnold, Supplement to Sales and
Secured Financing 422-33 (1962).
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accepted. It may be thought of as a condemnation, not only of the
double faced warranty disclaimer, but also as a condemnation of a
monopolistic attempt to influence the expectations of his customers.
Permitting the manufacturer or marketer of the product to influence
the expectations of the consumer is consistent with the rationale of
consumer protection embodied in implied warranty which has already
been discussed. Actually, it would be unwise to impose absolute
liability upon the manufacturer of an automobile for all defects under
a theory of consumer expectation, and at the same time deny him the
right to mold this expectation. If the liability is unalterable then it
would be better to talk in terms of strict liability and section 402A
of the proposed Restatement of Torts. As noted earlier, that liability
cannot be disclaimed. Here, however, the consumer pays a price. This
liability which may not be disclaimed does not extend to all defects, it
is present only when the object is unreasonably dangerous.
If it is admitted that the chattel purchased is unmerchantable
whenever unexpected harm results from its normal use and, at the same
time the marketer is always permitted to escape liability by informing
the purchaser of potential harm, reality may eventually be achieved in
the handling of this type of liability. At present, neither the approach
to imposition of liability nor negation of it is realistic. Currently, we
talk of cigarettes which may cause cancer as being merchantable or
invoke the reasonable expectation test in food cases. At the same
time, clauses are approved which exempt the manufacturer from
liability but which in no way inform the purchaser of the potentialities
for harm inherent in the product.10 If we allow the manufacturer to
shape consumer expectation at any time without regard to market
structure or inequality in bargaining power, we then will be in a posi-
tion to extend to the consumer protection against all harm from normal
use under an implied warranty theory.
Under the suggested approach, will a manufacturer or marketer
wish to use a disclaimer to inform the consumer of possible hazards?
In many cases he probably will not. In a 1954 decision, Judge Frank,
in dissent,101 thought that the manufacturer of a baby bathinette had
the duty to warn purchasers of the fire hazard presented by its mag-
nesium components. He remarked:
To comprehend the nature of defendant's negligence, one has
but to ask whether defendant could have sold their bathi-
nettes, if there had been affixed an easily-readable notice
saying, 'If a fire happens in your home, this bathinette will
100 Even the Uniform Commercial Code may sanction the exclusion of warranties
through language that will not really inform the consumer of what is happening. Cf.
§§ 2-316(2) & (3).
101 Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1954).
PHYSICAL HARM
probably increase the dangers greatly, because the mag-
nesium may ignite, causing unusual spurts of flame which will
be particularly difficult to extinguish.'
This same reasoning applies to disclaimers."0 2 If it was required that
they really inform consumers of the hazards inherent in the use of a
product, perhaps some products would go off the market. If so, then
they are on the market today because consumers are deluded as to
their desirable qualities. The disclaimer in Henningsen should be con-
sidered invalid, not because it was imposed upon a small buyer by a
big seller, but because it did not tell the consumer that he might ex-
pect his car to fail within a month of purchase.
What of a new product which the manufacturer has tested and
found to be safe but which it later develops has qualities injurious to
some people? Of what can the manufacturer warn? All he need do is
inform the purchaser of the possibility that some injurious quality may
be discovered later.
What of the situation in which the product is marketed in a way
that it is difficult or impossible to give warning of dangers. Such a case
is illustrated by the sale of fresh fruits and vegetables, e.g., the danger
of a strawberry allergy.0 3 The grower of the strawberries would seem
to have three choices. First, to choose a chain of distribution through
which warning could be given. Second, to bear the risk of warranty
liability. Third, to embark upon a program of institutional advertising
to inform the public of the qualities of the product. Recently a milk
association published an advertisement aimed at combating the popu-
larity of low-fat diets.' 4 There is no reason why large advertising
102 Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of
Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 281, 314-16 (1961).
103 No reported cases have been found in which recovery was sought for losses
caused by a strawberry allergy. However, this hypothetical allergy has received much
attention. See Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 465, 162 A.2d
513, 516 (1960); Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass, 469, 473, 19 N.E.2d 697,
699 (1939) (reserving opinion on liability issue); Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa.
Super. 516, 521, 19 A.2d 502, 503 (1941); Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235
P.2d 525, 527 (1951); Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 928, 934-35 (1957); Horowitz, Allergy of the
Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based Upon Breach of Implied Warranty of Quality,
24 So. Calif. L. Rev. 221, 236 (1951); Keeton, Products Liability-Current Develop-
ments, 40 Texas L. Rev. 193, 209 (1961); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 Calif. L. Rev.
809, 834 (1955); 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1586 (1956); Restatement
(Second), Torts § 402A, Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). Most authorities assume
that there are good reasons for not compensating the individual who suffers from a
strawberry rash, and perhaps there are. However, many of the reasons involve assump-
tions of fact, e.g., that such allergies are mild or very well known. If the strawberry
rash case ever gets to court it is hoped that these issues of fact will be tried before a
jury. It might be interesting to hear proof of the widely held knowledge about these
allergies which is so often assumed to justify the position that the goods are not
defective.
104 Wall St. Jour., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 9 (advertisement of American Dairy Ass'n).
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campaigns could not inform of hazards as well as benefits. This, of
course, is not human nature. Marketers of goods will continue to
profit from consumer expectations concerning the benefits of their
products as long as they can convince the courts that they should not
be liable for all harms traceable to such wonderful products.
It is true that any rule of law may be corroded by undue rigidity.
The suggested rule of liability will not work unless the marketer is
permitted to mold expectations if it so chooses. Currently, disclaimers
are not popular and, in light of the way they have been used, this
attitude is justified. On the other hand, great care should be taken in
picking situations in which their use should be denied to a whole in-
dustry. The violent reaction of the Henningsen court may not turn out
to be in the best interest of consumers since the price of suppressing
the standard disclaimer will probably be a watering down of the con-
cept of defect for warranty purposes. Although the factual issues in-
volved are more difficult to settle, insistance upon adequate communi-
cation in the molding of consumer expectations has, in connection with
the standard of warranty liability already discussed, much greater
potential for consumer protection. If the day comes when all marketers
are unreservedly honest about the goods they sell, then the consumers'
views about the nature of chattels will be greatly changed and there
will no longer be a need for the implied warranty of merchantability,
at least so far as personal injuries are concerned. The now uncertain
area occupied by this warranty will be replaced by contract term,
express warranty and the knowledge possessed by sophisticated and
well informed consumers.
